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INTRODUCTION
A number of United States industries that are dependent upon
natural resources for the production of their goods have been severely
injured by the practices of foreign governments.' These foreign gov-
ernments use a two-tiered pricing scheme to subsidize domestic
purchases of natural resources.2 The foreign governments provide
natural resources to their own domestic industries at one price while
making the resources available (if at all) to foreign industries at a
higher price. Mexico's subsidization of carbon black is an example of
this two-tiered pricing scheme. In 1982, the Mexican government
used PEMEX (a controlled oil monopoly) to sell carbon black feed-
stock to Mexican producers of carbon black for less than $2.00 per
barrel while U.S. producers paid the world price of $26.00 per barrel.3
Such subsidization makes United States industries less competitive at
home and abroad than foreign industries that receive government sub-
sidies. In response to this problem, Congress has introduced several
bills designed to protect United States domestic manufacturers.4
These bills apply countervailing duties to goods receiving the benefit of
natural resource subsidies in other countries.
Section one of this Note will introduce and discuss the existing
countervailing duty and trade retaliatory laws of the United States.
The Note will then analyze the natural resource bills pending in Con-
gress. Section two will consider whether existing United States trade
remedies and countervailing duty law can adequately remedy the
problems posed by natural resource subsidies. Section two will then
discuss how the natural resource bills deviate from and improve
1. The domestic industries injured by foreign natural resource subsidies include virtu-
ally all industries dependent upon natural resources for the production of their products.
These industries include those involved in the production or refinement of nitrogen,
cement, timber and other forest products, various building materials, petroleum and gaso-
line, tile, and various chemical agricultural products. Proposed Amendments to the Coun-
tervailing Duty Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. - (1985).
2. A subsidy is "a bounty or grant (usually provided by a government) that confers a
financial benefit on the production, manufacture, or distribution of goods or services."
TWENTY-SIxTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 1981-82, at 62 (1982). Subsidies have traditionally been
broken down into two categories: 1) domestic subsidies; and 2) export subsidies. Export
subsidies are specifically designed to improve export performance (export contingent)
whereas domestic subsidies are granted without regard to export performance. Id. Subsi-
dies granted on natural resources are a form of domestic subsidy.
3. Proposed Amendments to the Countervailing Duty Law, supra note 1, at 28-31
(statement of Samuel B. Coco, Jr., Executive Vice President, Cabot Corp.).
4. For a discussion of legislative bills proposing the application of countervailing
duties to natural resource subsidies, see infra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
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existing countervailing duty law. The Note will next consider whether
the natural resource bills are contrary to the letter or spirit of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)5 and the Subsidies
Code.6 Finally the Note will consider the dangers of trade retaliation
and mirror legislation by United States trade partners that could result
if the natural resource bills are enacted.
This Note argues that the current legislation: 1) is necessary to
remedy the problems caused by foreign natural resource subsidies; 2)
departs from, and improves, existing countervailing duty law; 3) does
not violate existing United States international trade obligations in let-
ter or spirit; and 4) possesses advantages that outweigh the dangers of
foreign trade retaliation and mirror legislation.
I. BACKGROUND
A. UNITED STATES COUNTERVAILING DUTY AND
TRADE RELIEF LAW
The basic United States countervailing duty and trade relief laws
consist of: 1) the Countervailing Duty Law of the Tariff Act of 1930
as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979; 2) Section 201 of
the Trade Act of 1974; and 3) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
Each of these trade laws will be discussed below.
L The Tariff Act of 1930 as Amended by the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979
The basic provision of United States countervailing duty law is
the Tariff Act of 19307 as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of
1979 (the TAA).s Since the enactment of the TAA,9 countervailing
duties have been governed under two separate sections of the Tariff
Act of 1930. Section 701 of the TAA applies to a "country under the
Agreement" as defined in the TAA.10 Section 303 of the Trade Act of
5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GAT].
6. Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T.
513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619 [hereinafter Subsidies Code].
7. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1303-1677h (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
8. Trade Agreement Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (codified at
19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677g (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) [hereinafter TAA].
9. The effective date of the TAA is January 1, 1980. The TAA approved and imple-
mented the agreements reached in the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
including the Subsidies Code. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
10. Section 701(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the TAA, defines a "coun-
try under the Agreement" as a country
(1) between the United States and which the Agreement on Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Measures applies, as determined under section 2503(b) of this title,
1987]
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1930 continues to apply to all other countries." Duties imposed
under section 303 must generally be imposed in accordance with the
provisions of the TAA. Section 303, however, does not require an
injury determination on dutiable goods as section 701 does.' 2
Most importantly, the TAA added the "specificity test" to United
States countervailing duty law. The TAA states that countervailable
subsidies include, "but [are] not limited to ... domestic subsidies, if
provided ... to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enter-
prises or industries .... ,,13 The Commerce Department has inter-
(2) which has assumed obligations with respect to the United States which are
substantially equivalent to obligations under the Agreement as determined by the
President ....
Tariff Act of 1930, § 701(b) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
12. The rules governing § 303 proceedings are identical to those for § 701 proceedings
under the TAA except that no injury determinations, agreements to suspend an investiga-
tion, or critical-circumstance determinations are made with respect to dutiable merchan-
dise under § 303. G. BRYAN, TAXING UNFAIR INTERNATIONAL TRADE PRACTICES: A
STUDY OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS 253 (1980). As
enacted, § 303 did not require that an injury determination be made before imposing a
countervailing duty. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 303, 46 Stat. 590, 687 (amended 1974,
1979).
Article VI, para. 5 of GATT requires an injury determination (i.e., that the subsidized
imports caused or threatened injury to an established U.S. industry, or materially retarded
the establishment of an industry) as a prerequisite to the imposition of a countervailing
duty. However, the Protocol of Provisional Application exempts previously existing legis-
lation from compliance with part II of GATT. Article VI is found in part II of GATT.
Since § 303 was enacted prior to 1947 (the enactment of GATT), its countervailing duty
law does not violate GATT despite its lack of an injury test. Bello & Holmer, Subsidies and
Natural Resources: Congress Rejects a Lateral Attack on the Specificity Test, 18 GEo.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 297, 297 n.1 (1984).
The Trade Act of 1974 amended § 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and extended it to duty-
free imports that received bounties or grants. Trade Act of 1974, § 331, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1303(a)(2) (1982); Bello & Holmer, supra, at 298 n.1. Because this change occurred after
1947, the GATT Protocol of Provisional Application requires an injury determination as
required by art. VI, para. 5 of the GATT. Thus, the Trade Act of 1974 amended
§ 303(a)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930 to authorize the imposition of countervailing duties on
duty-free imports benefited by bounties or grants only when the International Trade Com-
mission finds material injury. Such an injury determination must be made only when
"required by the international obligations of the United States," including those of the
GATT. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1982). See Bello & Holmer, supra, at 298 n.1.
13. The TAA and § 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 use the term "subsidy" as opposed to
"bounty or grant." The TAA states:
The term subsidy has the same meaning as the term "bounty or grant" as that term
is used in section [1303] of this title, and includes, but is not limited to, the
following:
(A) any export subsidy described in Annex A to the agreement (relating to
illustrative list of export subsidies).
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by government
action to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries,
whether publicly or privately owned, and whether paid or bestowed directly or
indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export of any class or kind of
merchandise:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loans guaranteed on terms inconsistent
with commercial considerations.
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preted this language to mean that only foreign domestic subsidies
provided to a "specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises
or industries" warrant the application of countervailing duties.
14
"Generally available" foreign domestic subsidies do not warrant the
application of countervailing duties under the TAA.15 This limitation
on the application of countervailing duties is called the specificity test.
Commerce has refused United States industry requests for counter-
vailing duties if the subsidy fails the specificity test.16 The current nat-
ural resource bills 17 were proposed in response to this problem.
2. Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974-the "Escape Clause"
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 197418 grants discretionary relief
where increased quantities of imports are "a substantial cause of seri-
ous injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing
an article like or directly competitive with the imported article."' 9
Section 201 is not aimed at dumped or subsidized imports, but pro-
vides temporary relief for industries injured by fair import competi-
tion. Section 201 allows the affected industry to make the necessary
adjustments to such competition.20 The President decides whether or
not to grant import relief after the International Trade Commission
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses sus-
tained by a specific industry.
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, production, or
distribution.
19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
14. See discussion of cases infra note 16.
15. During the Congressional hearings and debates on the legislative bills discussed in
this Note, a number of participants referred to the specificity test as the "general availabil-
ity test." This label is misleading because a "domestic subsidy program in another country
need not be generally available to escape U.S. countervailing duties, but need only be pro-
vided more widely than to 'a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or
industries.' 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1982)." Bello & Holmer, supra note 12, at 299 n.7
(emphasis in original).
16. Anhydrous and Aqua Ammonia From Mexico (Ammonia From Mexico), 48 Fed.
Reg. 28,522 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final determination); Carbon Black from Mexico, 48
Fed. Reg. 29,564 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final determination); Portland Hydraulic Cement
and Cement Clinker From Mexico (Cement From Mexico), 48 Fed. Reg. 43,063 (Dep't
Comm. 1983) (final determination); Certain Softwood Products From Canada, 48 Fed.
Reg. 24,159 (Dep't Comm. 1983) (final determination) are frequently cited and illustrative
examples of Commerce's application of the specificity test. For discussions of these cases
and others see Bello & Holmer, supra note 12, at 308, 312. For a particularly detailed
discussion of Ammonia From Mexico, see Note, Upstream Subsidies and U.S. Counter-
vailing Duty Law: The Mexican Ammonia Decision and the Trade Remedies Reform Act of
1984, 16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 263, 278-84 (1984).
17. See infra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
18. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1982).
19. Id. § 2251(b)(1).
20. Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, Foreign Government Regulation of Natural
Resources: Problems and Remedies Under United States International Trade Laws, 21
STAN. J. INT'L L. 29, 87 (1985) (citing S. Rep. No. 1289, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 119 (1974)).
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(ITC) conducts an investigation and makes a positive finding.21 When
the ITC decides that a trade injury exists, it recommends to the Presi-
dent the degree and form of trade restriction needed to remedy the
injury.22 The President has discretion to accept, reject, or modify the
Commission's ruling.23 In making this determination, the President
considers a number of statutorily mandated factors in addition to any
that he considers important.24 Relief is granted by imposing duties,
tariff-rate quotas, quantitative restrictions on imports, orderly market-
ing arrangements, or any combination thereof.25 Under section 201,
relief is only intended to be temporary. 26
3. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 197427 allows the President to
take action against any foreign trade practice that is "inconsistent with
... or... denies benefits to the United States under, any trade agree-
ment or... is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and bur-
dens or restricts United States commerce .... -28 After receiving a
21. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2252 (1982).
22. Id. § 2251(d)(1).
23. Id. § 2252. Prior to Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983) (holding unconstitutional the invalidation of executive acts by a house of Con-
gress), Congress could override presidential action regarding import relief. If the President
decided to take action that differed from the action recommended by the ITC, or if he
decided not to provide import relief, then Congress could override the President upon
enactment of a joint resolution within ninety days of the transmission of the President's
report. If such action was taken by Congress, the action recommended by the ITC would
take effect. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 58:0106 (1986). However, as a result of Chadha, a
legislative veto of presidential action would be unconstitutional.
24. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)(l)-(9) (1982). The statutorily mandated factors include the
following: 1) the probable effectiveness of import relief as a means to promote adjustment,
the efforts being made or to be implemented by the industry concerned to adjust to import
competition, and other considerations relative to the position of the industry in the nation's
economy; 2) the extent to which firms or workers in the industry have applied for, are
receiving, or are likely to receive adjustment assistance; 3) the effect of import relief on
consumers and on competition in the domestic markets for such articles; 4) the effect of
import relief on the international economic interests of the United States; 5) the impact on
United States industries and firms as a consequence of any possible modification of duties
or other import restrictions which may result from international obligations with respect to
compensation; 6) the geographic concentration of imported products marketed in the
United States; 7) the extent to which the United States market is the focal point for exports
of such articles by reason of restraints on exports of such articles to, or on imports of such
articles into, third country markets; and 8) the economic and social costs that would be
incurred by taxpayers, communities, and workers, if import relief were or were not pro-
vided. Id.
25. Id. § 2253(a)(l)-(5).
26. Trade restrictions are limited to five years, and gradual liberalization is encouraged
if the restrictions last beyond three years. Id. § 2253(h)(l)-(2). One three-year extension
period is allowed. Id. § 2253(h)(3). Although this extension period would allow for an
eight-year period of relief, in practice relief is generally imposed for no more than three
years. Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, supra note 20, at 88.
27. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
28. The relevant portion of § 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 reads as follows:
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petition for relief, the United States Trade Representative must deter-
mine whether to initiate an investigation.29 After initiating an investi-
gation, the Trade Representative must consult and negotiate with the
offending country.30 If a negotiated settlement is not reached, then the
Trade Representative must recommend appropriate retaliatory action
to the President.31 The President has discretion 32 to withdraw trade
agreement concessions or benefits or impose duties or other import
restrictions.33
(a) Determinations requiring action
(1) In general.-If the President determines that action by the United States is
appropriate-
(A) to enforce the rights of the United States under any trade agreement; or
(B) to respond to any act, policy, or practice of a foreign country or instru-
mentality that-
(i) is inconsistent with the provisions of, or otherwise denies benefits to
the United States under, any trade agreement, or
(ii) is unjustifiable, unreasonable, or discriminatory and burdens or
restricts United States commerce;
the President shall take all appropriate and feasible action within his power to
enforce such rights or to obtain the elimination of such act, policy, or practice.
(2) Scope of action-The President may exercise his authority under this sec-
tion with respect to any goods or sector-
(A) on a nondiscriminatory basis or solely against the foreign country or
instrumentality involved, and
(3) without regard to whether or not such goods or sector were involved in
the act, policy, or practice identified under paragraph (1).
(b) Other action. Upon making a determination described in subsection (a) of
this section, the President, in addition to taking action referred to in such subsec-
tion, may-
(1) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of, or refrain from proclaim-
ing, benefits of trade agreement concessions to carry out a trade agreement with
the foreign country or instrumentality involved;
(2) impose duties or other import restrictions on the products of, and, notwith-
standing any other provision of law, fees or restrictions on the services of, such
foreign country or instrumentality for such time as he determines appropriate.
Id. § 2411(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
Under the definitions added by the 1984 Amendments "unreasonable" means "any act,
policy, or practice which, while not necessarily in violation of or inconsistent with the
international legal rights of the United States, is otherwise deemed to be unfair and inequi-
table." Id. § 2411(e)(3). "Unjustifiable" means "any act, policy, or practice which is in
violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the United States." Id.
§ 2411(e)(4). "Discriminatory" includes "any act, policy, or practice which denies national
or most-favored-nation treatment to the United States goods, services, or investment." Id.
§ 2411 (e)(5).
29. Id. § 2412.
30. Id. § 2413. If the offending country is a GATT signatory, the consultation and
investigation will take place within the GATT framework.
31. Id. § 2414.
32. Id. § 2411 (a)(2); see supra note 28 and accompanying text. The President has vir-
tually complete discretion in deciding to retaliate under this provision. Any retaliatory
measures taken by the President may be removed whenever he considers it appropriate to
do so. 1 INT'L TRADE REP. (3NA) 49:0102 (1986).
33. 19 U.S.C. §§ 241 1(a)(1), 2411(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
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B. THE GATT AND SUBSIDY CODE RULES REGARDING
DOMESTIC SUBSIDIES
1. The GATT
The GATT is a multilateral treaty that attempts to govern the
application of subsidies, countervailing duties, and antidumping proce-
dures among its signatories. While the GATT provides remedies and
dispute settlement procedures for countries injured by subsidies and
dumping, it does not expressly prohibit the use of domestic subsidies.
Article XVI of the GATT requires any party maintaining any subsidy
to notify the Contracting Parties of the subsidy, and to discuss with
the Contracting Parties the possibility of limiting the subsidy if it
causes or threatens serious injury to any Contracting Party.34
The GATT allows its members to use countermeasures against
domestic subsidies. 35 The countervailing duty is the most significant
of these countermeasures. 36 Article VI provides that no Contracting
Party shall levy any countervailing duty unless the effect of the foreign
domestic subsidy is to "cause or threaten material injury to an estab-
lished domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially the estab-
lishment of a domestic industry. '37
A second possible countermeasure against foreign subsidies is
found in article XIX. Under Article XIX, the suspension of a GAIT
obligation or the withdrawal or modification of a GATT concession
related to the imports of a product is allowed if increased imports of
such product causes injury or the threat of injury to domestic manu-
facturers of like or directly competitive products.38 The article XIX
countermeasure is intended to be temporary. 39
Article XXIII provides a third possible countermeasure. Article
XXIII grants certain rights of consultation to a contracting party
whose rights are nullified or impaired by the actions of another con-
tracting party. In extreme cases, article XXIII allows suspension of
GATT concessions or obligations as a countermeasure. 40
34. GATT, supra note 5, art. XVI(1).
35. J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 377 (1969).
36. Id.
37. GATT, supra note 5, art. VI(5)(a). Art. VI(5) states that the Contracting Parties
may waive this prohibition
so as to permit a contracting party to levy [a] ... countervailing duty on the
importation of any product for the purpose of offsetting... subsidization which
causes or threatens material injury to an industry in the territory of another con-
tracting party exporting the product concerned to the territory of the importing
contracting party.
Id
38. GATT, supra note 5, art. XIX(1)(a); J. JACKSON, supra note 35, at 377-78.
39. GATT, supra note 5, art. XIX(1)(a).
40. Id. art. XXIII; J. JACKSON, supra note 35, at 378. If any contracting party believes
any benefit accruing to it under the Agreement is being impeded, such party may make
[Vol. 20:197
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2. The Subsidies Code
The Subsidies Code interprets and elaborates on the GATT pro-
visions dealing with subsidies and countervailing duties.41 Although
the Subsidies Code contains no express prohibition on the use of
domestic subsidies, it does contain much language on proper use and
scope of subsidies.42 However, this language is ambiguous, and it is
therefore difficult to draw clear conclusions from its provisions.43
The Subsidies Code provides two avenues, or "Tracks," of reme-
dial action for Contracting Parties injured by the subsidy practices of
other Contracting Parties.44 Track I of the Subsidies Code (articles 1-
6) authorizes GATT members to employ their domestic procedures to
apply countervailing duties.45 Article 6 of the Subsidies Code states
that authorities of the importing country decide whether to impose a
countervailing duty.46 Article 3 of the Subsidies Code states that sig-
natories will be afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with the
party initiating a countervailing duty investigation under its domestic
machinery.47
Track II of the Subsidies Code (articles 7-19) provides a govern-
ment-to-government complaint procedure. 48 Under Article 12, when
written recommendations or proposals to the other Contracting Party or Parties which it
considers to be concerned. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIII(1). If no satisfactory adjust-
ment is reached within a reasonable time, the matter may be referred to the Contracting
Parties who will make recommendations or give a ruling on the matter. If the Contracting
Parties consider the circumstances to be serious enough, "they may authorize a contracting
party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such
obligations or concessions under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the
circumstances. Id. art. XXIII(2).
41. See supra note 6.
42. See infra note 118.
43. Id.
44. Track I and II are the terms used by the government negotiators of the Code.
Barcel6, Subsidies, Countervailing Duties, and Antidumping after the Tokyo Round, 13
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 257, 264 n.29 (1980). Track I is based on article VI of GAT and
Track II on article XXIII of GAIT.
45. 1979 Act, supra note 8, § 1671, and 1974 Act, supra note 12, §§ 201, 301 would be
the proper domestic machinery through which such countervailing duty actions are initi-
ated. Such measures are only effective as a remedy where U.S. industry has lost a share of
the domestic market as a result of foreign subsidies.
46. Subsidies Code, supra note 6, art. 4(1). The investigations conducted must follow
the procedures set forth in article 2 (domestic procedures and related matters), and article 6
(determination of injury). Generally stated, the Code authorizes the imposition of such
countervailing duties after reasonable consultation efforts and a determination is made that
the subsidy is causing injury.
47. Id. art. 3.
48. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, supra note 8, incorporated these Track II
provisions into U.S. law by amending the President's trade retaliation authority in § 301 of
the Trade Act of 1974, supra note 12. If the trade representative decides to initiate an
investigation, § 301 mandates that he must simultaneously invoke the Track II dispute
settlement procedures. Barcel6, The Two-Track Subsidies Code - Countervailing Duties
and Trade Retaliation, in NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AFTER THE TOKYO ROUND 121, 138 (J.
Quinn & P. Slayton eds. 1982).
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a signatory believes that another signatory is granting a subsidy and
the subsidy is causing "injury," "nullification or impairment," or
"serious prejudice," the affected state may request consultations with
the subsidizing signatory.49 If consultations fail to produce a mutually
acceptable solution, any signatory party involved in the consultations
may refer the matter to the Committee on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures for conciliation. 0 However, if conciliation fails, the
matter will be submitted to a panel for dispute resolution." If no solu-
tion is reached, the Committee of Signatories may make recommenda-
tions to the parties. The parties must follow the recommendations
within a reasonable period or the Committee may authorize appropri-
ate countermeasures. 52
C. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION
There are currently a number of legislative proposals pending in
Congress that seek to apply countervailing duties to natural resource
subsidies. These proposals partially result from dissatisfaction with
the Commerce Department's application of the specificity test. The
proposals also are based on the belief that other countervailing or
trade retaliatory laws cannot adequately handle the natural resource
subsidy problem.
1. The Predecessors of the Current "Natural Resource
Subsidy" Legislation
The Ninety-Eighth Congress introduced two natural resource
subsidy bills-H.R. 4015 (the Moore bill)53 and H.R. 4784 (the Gib-
bons bill).54 The bills were very similar5 5 to their successor bills in the
Track II of § 301 is the only available remedy for an American exporter who loses mar-
ket share abroad because of a foreign subsidy. Track I and the domestic procedures dis-
cussed are useful only in remedying the damage caused by subsidized domestic imports.
Track II of § 301 can also be utilized in this situation. Id. at 138.
49. Subsidies Code, supra note 6, art. 12(3). The request for consultation must contain
proof that the subsidy has adversely affected the signatory's interests.
50. Id. arts. 13, 17. The Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures is au-
thorized by article 16.
51. Id. arts. 13, 18.
52. Id. arts. 13(4), 18(9). Such countermeasures are nullification or impairment rights
as described in article XXIII of GATT.
53. H.R. 4015, 98th Cong., Ist Sess., 129 CONG. Rc. H7648 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1983).
H.R. 4015 was introduced on September 28, 1983, and subsequently defeated in Congress.
54. H.R. 4784, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 771(5)(c), 130 CONG. REC. H7939 (daily ed. July
26, 1984). H.R. 4784 was introduced on February 8, 1984 and subsequently defeated in
Congress.
55. The only significant difference between the two bills was the method in which they
calculated the amount of subsidy. H.R. 4015 calculated the amount of subsidy as the dif-
ference between the domestic price of the natural resource and its fair market value. H.R.
4015, supra note 53. H.R. 4784, however, calculated the amount of subsidy as the differ-
ence between the domestic price of the natural resource product and the export price of the
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Ninety-Ninth Congress. 56 Although these bills directly addressed the
issue of natural resource subsidies, several other bills were introduced
during the Ninety-Eighth Congress that indirectly reached natural
resource subsidies.57
2. The "Natural Resource Subsidy" Bills
The "natural resource subsidy" bills currently under considera-
tion in Congress are H.R. 2345 (the Moore bill)58 and H.R. 2451 (the
product. However, fair market value would have been used instead of export price if: 1)
there were no significant exports of that product; or 2) the export price of that product was
distorted either up or down because of government manipulation. H.R. 4784, supra note
54.
56. For a discussion of the differences between 4784 and 2451 (the natural resource bill
proposed by Gibbons in the Ninety-Ninth Congress), see Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis,
supra note 20, at 51. For a discussion of the differences between 4015 and 2345 (the natural
resource bill proposed by Moore in the Ninety-Ninth Congress) see id. at 49.
57. See H.R. 4124, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. H8194 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1983), and Unfair Trade Practices Act of 1983, H.R. 3801, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(a),
771(5)(C) (1983). For a discussion of these two bills, see Barshefsky, Diamond, & Ellis,
supra note 20.
58. H.R. 2345, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985), reads as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That paragraph (5) of section 771 (19 U.S.C.
§ 1677) is amended to read as follows:
(5) SUBSIDY.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-The term 'subsidy' has the same meaning as the
term 'bounty or grant' as that term is used in section 303 of this Act, and
includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(i) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the Agreement (relating to illus-
trative list of export subsidies).
(ii) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by government action to a
specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or industries, whether publicly or
privately owned, and whether paid or bestowed directly or indirectly on the manufacture,
production, or export of any class or kind of merchandise:
(I) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent
with commercial considerations.
(II) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
(11) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses
sustained by a specific industry.
(IV) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, production,
or distribution.
(iii) Any natural resource subsidy described in subparagraph (B).
(3) NATURAL RESOURCE SUBSIDY.-
(i) IN GENERAL.-A natural resource subsidy exists if a natural resource prod-
uct is provided or sold within a country (hereinafter referred to as the 'exporting
country') by a government-regulated or controlled entity, for use (directly or indi-
rectly) in the manufacture or production of any class or kind of merchandise in the
exporting country, at a domestic price that, by reason of such regulation or
control-
(I) is lower than the fair market value of the product in the exporting coun-
try, and
(II) constitutes a significant portion of the total cost of the manufacture or
production of such merchandise.
The existence of a natural resource subsidy may be indicated if the exporting coun-
try, as a condition under which the natural resource product is provided by a gov-
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Gibbons bill). 59 The bills differ only in a few minor respects. The
Gibbons bill is the lead bill. This bill defines a "resource import sub-
ernment-regulated or controlled entity for use in the manufacture or production of
the merchandise, imposes specific export or other performance requirements regard-
ing that manufacture or production.
(ii) LEVEL OF NATURAL RESOURCE SUBSIDY.-
The level of a natural resource subsidy is the difference
between the domestic price of the natural resource product
and the fair market value of that product.
(iii) DETERMINATION OF FAIR MARKET
VALUE.-For purposes of this subparagraph, the term 'fair
market value' means the price that a willing buyer would
pay a willing seller for a natural resource product in an
arms-length transaction in the absence of government regu-
lation. In determining the fair market value, the adminis-
tering authority shall take into account-
(I) the prices at which the product is generally available in world markets,
(II) the extent to which a comparative advantage of the exporting country
in relation to other sellers exists (for example, any cost savings resulting from
such factors as the availability of abundant supplies, lower production costs,
or lower transportation costs),
(III) the degree to which the price of the natural resource or byproduct is
depressed as a result of government regulation of eligibility to purchase that
natural resource or by-product,
(IV) whether a system of dual pricing is maintained through government
regulation in the country of export, and
(V) the availability or lack of access to export markets.
59. H.R. 2451, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The proposed bill reads as follows:
To amend title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 in order to apply countervailing duties
with respect to resource input subsidies.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That subtitle D of title VII of the Tariff Act of
1930 (19 U.S.C. 1677 et seq.) is amended-
(1) by adding at the end of section 771(5) the following:
(C) Any resource input subsidy provided for under section 771B; and
(2) by adding after section 771A the following new section:
SECTION 771B. RESOURCE INPUT SUBSIDIES.
(a) GENERAL RULE.-A resource input subsidy exists if-
(1) a product (hereinafter referred to in this section as an 'input
product')-
(A) is provided or sold by a government or a government-regulated or
controlled entity within a country (hereinafter referred to in this section
as 'exporting country'), for input use within that country, at a domestic
price that-
(i) is lower than the fair market value of the input product; and
(ii) is not freely available to United States producers for purchase of
the input product for export to the United States; and
(B) would, if sold at the fair market value, constitute a significant por-
tion of the total cost of the manufacture or production of the merchan-
dise in or for which the input product is used; or
(2) the right to remove or extract a product (hereinafter in this section
referred to as the 'removal right') is provided or sold by a government or a
government-regulated or controlled entity within a country and-
(A) that product is for input use within that country;
(B) the removal right is provided or sold at a domestic price that is
lower than the fair market value of that right, and
(C) the product to which the removal right applies would, if that right
was sold at a fair market value, constitute a significant portion of the
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sidy" as an "input product" or "removal right" sold by "a government
or government-regulated or controlled entity" to domestic industries
total cost of the manufacture or production of the merchandise in or for
which the product is used.
(b) AMOUNT OF RESOURCE INPUT SUBSIDIES.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-The amount of a resource input subsidy is the dif-
ference between the domestic price of an input product, or of a removal
right, and the fair market value of that product, or right, respectively.
(2) EXCLUSIONS.-For purposes of this section, the term 'domestic
price' and 'fair market value' do not include-
(A) with respect to an input product, the costs incident to transporting
and handling required to move the product from its point of production
to the respective domestic or foreign destination; and
(B) with respect to a removal right, the cost or value of any activity the
recipient of the right must undertake as a condition for receiving that
right.
(c) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this section-
(1) FAIR MARKET VALUE.-The term 'fair market value' means-
(A) with respect to an input product, the price that, in the absence of
government regulation or control, a willing buyer would pay a willing
seller for that product from the exporting country in an arms-length
transaction; and
(B) with respect to a removal right-
(i) the price paid for a comparable removal right in a comparable
region in the country (other than the country providing or selling the
right) which has the largest number of arms-length sales of such rights,
or
(ii) if no country sells a comparable removal right at arms-length, the
price that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller in an arms-length
transaction for the removal right in the country providing or selling
the right.
In determining the fair market value of an input product, the administer-
ing authority shall take into account-
(i) the export price of the product,
(ii) the prices at which the product is generally available in world
markets,
(iii) the current market clearing price at which the product can be
sold competitively by the exporting country in the markets of other
countries (including the United States) that are non-Statecontrolled-
economy-country markets, and
(iv) the availability to the exporting country of markets described in
clause (iii).
(2) INPUT USE.-The "term input use" refers to the use (directly or
indirectly) of an input product in the manufacture or production of any
class or kind of merchandise that is the subject of an investigation under
this title.
SECTION 2. INJURY TEST REQUIRED IN ALL CASES IN WHICH
RESOURCE INPUT SUBSIDIES ARE ALLEGED
Notwithstanding subsection (b) of section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19
U.S.C. 1303), sections 703(a) and 705(b) of that Act (relating to injury determina-
tions by the United States International Trade Commission) shall apply to any
investigation under that section in which the existence of resource input subsidies
under section 771B of that Act is alleged.
SECTION 3. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The amendments made by this Act shall apply with respect to investigations
initiated by petition or the administering authority under subtitle A of title VII of
the Tariff Act of 1930 on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
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at below fair market value. Two further conditions must be met
before such removal rights or input products qualify as resource
import subsidies under the Gibbons bill. First, the input product or
removal right must not be freely available to U.S. purchasers at the
controlled domestic price. Second, the input product or removal right
must constitute a "substantial portion" of the production costs of the
final, exported productA0 A resource import subsidy will be
countervailable if the United States producer demonstrates that the
export of the final product caused material injury. 61 The amount of
the subsidy is defined as the difference between the domestic price and
the "fair market value" of the resource.62 Estimation of fair market
value includes a number of different factors.63
A major concern with the Gibbons bill is whether it violates
GATT.64 This fear was also a major concern with the Gibbons bill's
predecessors. However, the current proposed bills are likely to pass
because United States manufacturers injured by natural resource sub-
sidies continue to pressure Congress for their passage.65 Yet, the pro-
posed bills differ in no major respects from their 1983 predecessors. 66
II. ANALYSIS
A. PRE-EXISTING TRADE LAW REMEDIES CANNOT EFFECTIVELY
HANDLE THE NATURAL
RESOURCE PROBLEM
Opponents of the natural resource subsidy proposals assert that
the legislation is unnecessary because existing United States trade law
can adequately address the natural resource subsidy problem. The
existing United States trade laws dealing with subsidies are found in
section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, and GATT and the Subsidies Code. Each of these provisions
will be examined below to determine whether the existing trade laws
are adequate to counter natural resource subsidy problems.
1. Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974
Opponents of the natural resource subsidy bills assert that section
201 provides an adequate means of relief for domestic industries
against natural resource subsidies. These critics, however, have given
60. Id. § 771B(a) (1985).
61. Id. § 771B(2).
62. Id. § 771B(b). For a definition offair market value, seesupra note 59 § 771B(c)(1).
63. H.R. 2451, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 771B(e)(B).
64. See infra note 112, Proposed Amendments to the Countervailing Duty Law.
65. Id.
66. See supra notes 55-56.
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little support for their beliefs other than a basic description of the way
section 201 works.67 Contrary to their assertions, section 201 is inef-
fective as a means of countering the natural resource subsidy problem
for several reasons. First, the burden of proof under the statute is high.
Imports must be the "substantial cause" of "serious injury" 68 before
any action can be taken under section 201.
Second, the President's decision of whether to accept the finding
of the ITC is discretionary. The President may decide not to grant
relief even though subsidized goods are the "substantial cause" of
"serious injury." In making his determination, the President is statu-
torily mandated to consider a broad range of factors. 69 Furthermore,
a single house of Congress can no longer legislatively veto the Presi-
dent's decision. 70 As a result of these factors and lack of Congres-
sional oversight, the President possesses a large amount of discretion
when dealing with natural resource subsidies. Such Presidential dis-
cretion may be unfair and destructive to existing domestic industries.
Moreover, if the President refuses to take action against natural
resource subsidies under section 201, there may be a strong disincen-
tive over time to the development and expansion of domestic industry.
Third, section 201 is ineffective as a means of countering the nat-
ural resource subsidy problem because it is intended to provide only
temporary relief. Although the statutory limit of relief is as long as
eight years, in practice, relief is rarely imposed for more than three.7 1
Additionally, because section 201 cases are highly political the peti-
tioner may have little control over his action.72
Fourth, section 201 has not proved effective as a source of import
relief from natural resource subsidies for domestic industry in the past.
During the ten years section 201 has been in effect, the ITC recom-
mended relief in thirty-one cases involving natural resource subsidies.
The President provided import relief in the form of increased duties,
quotas, or orderly marketing agreements in only eleven cases. 73 In
67. See Bello & Holmer, supra note 12, at 326-27; see also Barshefsky, Diamond &
Ellis, supra note 20, at 87-88.
68. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 24 for a description of these factors. Numerous circumstances exist
where the President would not grant relief regardless of the injury's magnitude.
70. See supra note 23. The unfettered discretion of the President after LN.S. v. Chadha
renders domestic industry's reliance upon § 201 relief even more untenable.
71. Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, supra note 20, at 88. If import relief is proclaimed
for more than three years, it shall be phased down during the period it is in effect beginning
not later than three years after the date it is initiated. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 58:0105
(1986).
72. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 58:0105 (1986).
73. Id. at 58:0106. In addition to the eleven cases in which import relief was granted,
the President did grant adjustment assistance in five cases. Whether adjustment assistance
presents comparable relief to import relief for a domestic industry injured by the influx of
subsidized goods presents a new issue which this Note does not discuss.
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fifteen cases, the President rejected relief on the grounds that relief
would not be in the national economic interests because of increased
costs to consumers, improvements in the industry, probability of for-
eign retaliation, or adverse impact on United States efforts to obtain
international reduction of trade barriers.74 Since section 201 has failed
in the past to provide relief against natural resource subsidies, it is
highly unlikely that it will prove successful in dealing with the prob-
lem in the future.
2. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 is designed to deal with
unfair or unreasonable trade practices.75 The natural resource subsidy
bills' opponents assert that natural resource subsidy problems involve
questions of reciprocity and the denial of equivalent access for United
States producers to foreign natural resources. According to the oppo-
nents of the bills, these questions fall squarely within the language of
section 301 covering unfair or unreasonable trade practices. 76 Those
parties favoring the use of section 301 also assert that section 301 is
plagued with fewer problems than other trade statutes. 77 As proof of
section 301's utility, the opponents of the natural resource subsidy bills
assert that over the last ten years approximately sixty percent of sec-
tion 301 cases have been successfully resolved. 78
Although section 301 does appear to be broad enough to cover
natural resource subsidies, it is an unsatisfactory solution to the natu-
ral resource subsidies problem for several reasons. The main reason a
section 301 action may be ineffective is that it involves numerous
domestic and international political considerations. 79 The President
74. Id.
75. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
76. Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, supra note 20, at 90-41; see also Proposed Amend-
ments to the Countervailing Duty Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 406 (1985) (testimony of Charlene
Barshefsky on behalf of the Coalition to Promote America's Trade). Barshefsky concludes
that the 1984 amendments to § 301 "make explicit the ability of the United States to attack
the type of practices at issue here." Id. at 408. Barshefsky further states that these provi-
sions of § 301 "have as their aim an opening of foreign investment and access opportunities
for United States producers-precisely the concerns addressed by the natural resource pro-
posals." Id.
77. As ways in which § 301 is plagued with fewer problems than are other trade stat-
utes, Barshefsky, Diamond and Ellis point out that § 301 relief can be long-term, the peti-
tioner's burden of proof is not overwhelming, and the practices of individual countries may
be addressed individually. Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, supra note 20, at 92.
78. Id. at 92 (citing Archibald, Section 301 of the Trade Act of.1974, in GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION DIVISION, U.S. INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE LAWS, at Appendix C (1985)).
79. Coffield, Using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a Response to Foreign Gov-
ernment Trade Actions: When, Why, and How, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 381, 399
(1981).
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has virtually complete discretion in deciding whether to bring a sec-
tion 301 action. 80 Political considerations may play a significant part
in the President's decision; in the past, the United States government
has gone to great lengths to avoid taking action against a foreign coun-
try subsidizing its goods. Instead, the United States government has
preferred to exert pressure on the subsidizing government to get some
reduction in the complained of act or policy.81
Section 301 proponents assert that over the last ten years sixty
percent of all actions under section 301 have been successfully
resolved. 82 However, it is unclear exactly what "successfully
resolved" means in the section 301 context. Most section 301 cases
are long and drawn out and involve a great deal of compromise on
both sides. 83 Like section 201, section 301 is an unsatisfactory solu-
tion to the natural resource subsidy problem because of its political
nature and drawn out dispute settlement procedure.
In both section 201 and 301 proceedings, it is unlikely that the
President would authorize the application of countervailing duties
against natural resource subsidies if the principle countervailing duty
law, the TAA of 1979, would not allow such action. The TAA
requires that the specificity test be met before the United States can
apply countervailing duties. 84 Therefore, the President's discretionary
decision making is likely to integrate the specificity test under both
sections 201 and 301.85
3. The GATT and Subsidies Code
The GATT and Subsidies Code provisions that permit signatories
to implement domestic trade laws and provide for inter-government
complaint procedures ineffectively protect United States industries
from natural resource subsidies. The provisions that permit signato-
ries to implement domestic countervailing duty or trade relief proce-
dures function as ineffectively as the previously discussed domestic
procedures.86The provisions providing for inter-government complaint
procedures have generally failed because they lack effective enforce-
ment procedures.87 In addition, government representatives disagree
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
83. Id.
84. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
85. Since the TAA is a legislative provision enacted by Congress, the President would
have little authority to disregard its requirements by acting under separate provisions.
86. See supra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. See generally Hudec, GAYT Disputes
Settlement After the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145
(1980).
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on which domestic subsidies deserve retaliatory action.
B. THE NATURAL RESOURCE SUBSIDY PROPOSALS' OMISSION OF
THE "SPECIFICITY TEST" AND THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR
U.S. TRADE LAW
Although the natural resource bills do not expressly reject the
1979 TAA's "specificity test," they do not include it in their definition
of a countervailable subsidy. 88 Whether the natural resource subsidy
bills contradict or merely supplement the TAA, they clearly adopt a
new standard for determining whether natural resource subsidies are
countervailable. Under these bills, natural resource subsidies will be
countervailed against regardless of their availability.89 Consequently,
the "specificity test" will no longer shield foreign natural resource sub-
sidies from the application of countervailing duties.
The "specificity test" as applied by the Department of Commerce
does not provide an adequate standard for determining whether coun-
tervailing duties should be administered. First, the specificity test is
ill-defined. Under the specificity test, it is unclear what constitutes "a
specific enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries." 90
Neither the Commerce Department nor judicial decisions provide a
useful interpretation of the language "to a specific enterprise or indus-
try or group of enterprises or industries." 91 Foreign governments, for-
eign-controlled entities and United States industries need clear
guidelines to accurately identify countervailable subsidies. The natu-
ral resource bills will avoid the uncertainties of the specificity test by
simply omitting it. Although the natural resource bills present their
own problems of calculation, 92 existing United States trade laws share
these problems.93
88. See supra notes 58-59.
89. See supra note 58-63.
90. The vagueness of this standard is a result of the difficulty of determining exactly
what a "specific enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries" is. Com-
pounding the problem is the great variety in the sizes of groups of enterprises or industries.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
91. See Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (Dep't Comm.
1983) (final determination).
92. See Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, supra note 20, at 73-74; see also infra note 93.
93. Opponents of the natural resource bills argue that certain terms employed by the
bills such as "fair market value" and the various factors listed in the bills used to determine
"fair market value" are incapable of precise calculation. See Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis,
supra note 20, at 73-74. Although such terms will present certain difficulties in calculation,
"fair market value" is a term frequently employed in domestic law. It is unlikely that its
calculation, even in an international setting, will be unworkable. Further, the current
countervailing duty law suffers from similar difficulties in determining the existence of a
government subsidy in the first place. Unlike the natural resource bills, the 1979 TAA does
not even employ a standard in determining whether or not a government subsidy exists.
The term subsidy is used without any attempt at definition in the 1979 TAA. In enacting
the 1979 TAA, Congress provided that the statutory term "subsidy" has the same meaning
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Second, the specificity test has not addressed the problem of nom-
inally available foreign subsidies. 94 Foreign governments frequently
make subsidies nominally available to more than a "specific enterprise
or industry or groups of enterprises or industries. '95 Although these
resource subsidies are technically available to many or all industries,
only a few specific industries actually use these subsidized resources in
their production processes. 96 Thus, foreign governments can com-
pletely evade the specificity test by providing subsidies that only a lim-
ited number of enterprises or industries actually use. Mexico's
subsidization of carbon black feedstock illustrates such an evasion of
the specificity test. Although only a "specific enterprise or industry or
groups of enterprises or industries" in Mexico use carbon black feed-
stock, the ITC has ruled that it is not countervailable because of its
availability to all domestic purchasers. 97 The Department of Com-
merce has inconsistently decided whether nominal general availability
of natural resource subsidies avoids countervailability.98 The natural
resource bills will resolve the problem of nominal availability by elimi-
nating the specificity test.
Third, the specificity test is too weak a standard of countervail-
as the term "bounty or grant" found in § 303. Bello & Holmer, supra note 12, at 300 n.12.
Likewise, the term "bounty or grant" is not defined in § 303.
94. For a more thorough discussion of the problem of nominal availability and the
specificity test, see Cameron & Berg, The U.S. Countervailing Duty Law and the Principle of
GeneralAvailability, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 497 (1985). The authors derive an alternative
formula to the specificity test which focuses on the relative effects of the subsidy on sectors
of the economy.
95. Id.
96. "The difficulty with the general availability doctrine is where to draw the line to
determine when a generally available practice protects a specific sector to such an extent
that the benefit becomes more specific than general." Note, supra note 16, at 290.
97. Carbon Black from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,564, 29,568 (Dep't Comm. 1983). See
Cameron & Berg, supra note 94, at 503. A further example of the failure of the specificity
standard to counteract the problem of nominal availability is provided in Certain Softwood
Products from Canada, supra note 91. Faced with two Canadian government programs
benefiting only timber-related industries, the Department of Commerce decided that one
was countervailable and the other was not. The program that the Department of Com-
merce decided was not countervailable allowed anyone to take advantage of it, but only
timber-related industries did so. Id. The countervailable program, however, provided a
benefit that would have been attractive to any company in any industry, but was available
to only a limited group of industries. Bello & Holmer, supra note 12, at 299.
98. Compare Carbon Black from Mexico, supra note 97, and Certain Softwood Prod-
ucts from Canada, supra note 91, where despite nominal availability no countervailable
duties were applied with Certain Steel Products from the Netherlands, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,372,
39,373-74 (Dep't Comm. 1982). In Certain Steel Products from the Netherlands, the
Department of Commerce found that although a Dutch high-technology program was
nominally available to all, the program disproportionately benefited the steel industry. The
Department of Commerce therefore applied countervailing duties to the case. G. HORLICK,
CURRENT ISSUES IN COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW, THE TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF
1979 - FOUR YEARS LATER 7, 35 (1983).
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ability.99 The natural resource bills will provide for a broader applica-
tion of countervailing duties by eliminating the specificity test.100
Under these bills, countervailability requires that a product be sold
below its fair market value and constitute a "significant portion" of the
total cost of manufacture or production of the countervailable goods.
The United States will countervail against goods whenever products
sold below fair market value compose a "significant portion" of the
total cost of their manufacture or production.
Finally, the specificity test makes a senseless distinction by differ-
entiating between generally available subsidies and government subsi-
dies that are only available to specific industries or enterprises. The
general availability of a government subsidy does not alter the fact
that it constitutes a significant portion of the total cost of manufacture
or production. A "significant" subsidy to an industry should be coun-
tervailed against regardless of its general availability. Conversely, an
"insignificant" government subsidy does not need to be countervailed
against if it is not generally available. Because countervailing duties
function to protect domestic industries from foreign governmental
subsidization, a distinction between generally available subsidies and
specifically available subsidies makes little sense.101 The "significant
portion" test of the natural resource bills more accurately targets those
goods that benefit from government subsidies than does the specificity
test. The natural resource bills focus on the subsidies' effect or impact,
whereas the specificity test concentrates on the formality of govern-
mental action.
Opponents of the natural resource bills argue that elimination of
the specificity test would "open up Pandora's box" by permitting the
United States to apply countervailing duties to virtually any goods
receiving the slightest governmental benefits.102 The bills' opponents
argue that remote governmental services within the accepted scope of
government activity-such as public education, welfare, and interstate
transportation systems-could be considered subsidies subject to
countervailing duties. 103 A closer examination reveals that the natural
99. Irrespective of the Department of Commerce's actual application of the specificity
standard, the standard as enacted appears to be too narrow. A subsidy provided to more
than a "specific enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries" may still be
applied to only a very small sector of industry. A review of Commerce decisions reveals
that the Department of Commerce has frequently held subsidies to be "generally available"
where in fact their application is quite limited.
100. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
101. For a thorough discussion of the possible reasons behind the application of coun-
tervailing duties to domestic subsidies, see Barcel6, supra note 48, at 130-35.
102. See G. HORLICK, supra note 98, at 63. Horlick is a former ITA Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Import Administration; see also Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, supra note 20,
at 63-66.
103. Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, supra note 20, at 70.
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resource bills would not lead to this problem. The United States
would not countervail a government subsidy unless it constituted a
"significant portion" of the total cost of the manufactured good.1°4
Remote government services would not be encompassed by such a
standard because they do not constitute a "significant portion" of the
total cost of manufactured goods.
C. ENACTMENT OF THE NATURAL RESOURCE BILLS WILL NOT
VIOLATE GATT AND THE SUBSIDIES CODE
1. The Specificity Standard Is Not Incorporated into GATT and the
Subsidies Code
Opponents of the natural resource subsidy proposals contend that
the specificity standard has universal acceptance as an integral part of
GATT and the Subsidies Code. 105 Therefore, they contend that the
failure to include the specificity standard in natural resource subsidy
bills violates GATT and the Subsidies Code.10 6 More specifically, the
bills' opponents claim that article 11(3) of the Subsidies Code incorpo-
rates the specificity test. 107 Article 11(3) states that social and eco-
nomic policy objectives "may be achieved ... by means of subsidies
granted with the aim of giving an advantage to certain enterprises...
[which] are normally granted either regionally or by sector." 10 8
Several responses can be made to the above argument posed by
opponents of the natural resource bills. First, the inclusion of the
specificity test in United States countervailing duty law does not make
it a universally accepted mandatory standard within GATT or the
Subsidies Code.
Second, the Subsidies Code does not necessarily incorporate the
specificity test merely because article 11(3) states that social and eco-
nomic policy objectives may be achieved by subsidies that are aimed at
giving an advantage to "certain enterprises" and "are normally
granted either regionally or by sector." The proponents of the theory
that article 11(3) incorporates the specificity test'0 9 presume that arti-
104. Admittedly, the standard of a "significant portion" of the total cost of the manufac-
tured good is not an absolutely clear standard. As evidenced by many United States trade
laws, such clear standards are not always attainable. However, the significant portion stan-
dard is a clearer standard than the "specificity test" or the standards of §§ 201, 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974.
105. See Proposed Amendments to the Countervailing Duty Law, supra note 1, at 313
(testimony of Michael B. Smith, Deputy United States Trade Representative); see also Bar-
shefsky, Diamond & Ellis, supra note 20, at 70.
106. Barshofsky, Diamond & Ellis, supra note 20, at 70.
107. Id.
108. Subsidies Code, supra note 6, art. 11(3).
109. Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, supra note 20, at 70. In reference to article 11(3),
the authors state that "[t]hese references help inform the explicit requirement in United
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cle 1 1(3)'s reference to the specificity test mandates its incorpora-
tion.'10 Although the quoted language of article 11(3) does refer to
the specificity test, it seems probable that if the drafters of the Subsi-
dies Code had intended to incorporate the specificity test, they would
have stated their intent more explicitly. The drafters could have stated
that the Subsidies Code incorporated the specificity test or used lan-
guage more indicative of the specificity test.1 1'
Third, critics of the natural resource bills have been unable to cite
any other provision of GATT or the Subsidies Code that suggests the
incorporation of the specificity test.1 2 If the Subsidies Code's drafters
intended to incorporate a provision as significant as the specificity test,
they certainly would have made more than one reference to it.
2. GATT and the Subsidies Code Do Not Expressly or Implicitly
Prohibit the Application of Countervailing Duties to Natural
Resource Subsidies
The imposition of countervailing duties through Track I of the
Subsidies Code merely requires compliance with the provisions of arti-
cle VI of the GATT and Subsidies Code articles 4, 5, and 6.113 These
sections contain no language suggesting that the imposition of coun-
tervailing duties contemplated by the natural resource bills violates
GATT or the Subsidies Code" 14
Opponents of the natural resource bills assert that the legislation
exceeds the permissible scope of GATT and the Subsidies Code even
though the bills may not expressly violate either." 5 They claim that
States law that only benefits 'provided... to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of
enterprises or industries' are countervailable." Id.
110. Even assuming that the specificity test was incorporated by reference into the Sub-
sidies Code, it can also be argued by negative implication that because section 11(3) con-
dones subsidies granted to specific enterprises or industries when achieving social and
economic policy objectives, section 11(3) must not condone them when not for social and
economic policy objectives.
111. For instance, the drafters could have said that they were incorporating the specific-
ity test or at least used the language of the specificity test instead of language such as
"certain enterprises."
112. See Proposed Amendments to the Countervailing Duty Law: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983);
Proposed Amendments to the Countervailing Duty Law, supra note 1, at 313.
113. Subsidies Code, supra note 6.
114. Id.
115. Opponents have put forward the argument that the natural resource bills violate
GATT and the Subsidies Code because art. 1 of the Subsidies Code essentially says that a
countervailing duty may not be applied unless GATT or the Subsidies Code provides for
such a countervailing duty and that GATT or the Subsidies Code do not provide for this
type of countervailing duty. Proposed Amendments to the Countervailing Duty Law, supra
note 112, at 135. This contention, however, appears to be an overly stretched reading of
art. 1 for the following reasons:
Article I - Application of Article VI of the General Agreement
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the natural resource bills apply countervailing duties against tradition-
ally non-countervailable domestic subsidies that legitimately fall
within both the GATT framework and within international trade.116
The bills' opponents contend that the natural resource bills would
deny rights that GATT and the Subsidies Code expressly grant to
lesser developed countries (LDC).117
The above arguments are unpersuasive for two principle reasons.
First, the Subsidies Code does not provide a clear conclusion concern-
ing the permissible scope of domestic subsidies to LDCs or non-
LDCs.118 Second, the countervailing duties and subsidies provisions
of the GAT and the Subsidies Code are entirely disconnected. The
allowance of a subsidy under the Subsidies Code does not preclude a
Signatories shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the imposition of a coun-
tervailing duty on any product of the territory of any signatory imported into the
territory of another signatory is in accordance with the provisions of Article VI of
the General Agreement and the terms of this Agreement.
Subsidies Code, supra note 6. Article I seems only to say that signatories must impose
countervailing duties in accordance with article VI of the GATT. The fact that article VI
of the GATT does not specifically provide for the imposition of the type of countervailing
duties at issue here would not appear to mean that it prohibits the imposition of such
duties.
116. Proposed Amendments to the Countervailing Duty Law, supra note 112, at 26 (testi-
mony of Alan Holmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import Administration); id. at 160
(testimony of Gerard Van Heuven, on behalf of United States-Mexico Chamber of Com-
merce); see also Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, supra note 20, at 63-66.
117. Proposed Amendments to the Countervailing Duty Law, supra note 112, at 160-62
(testimony of Gerard Van Heuven).
118. The Preamble to the Subsidies Code states: "Recognizing that subsidies are used
by governments to promote important objectives of national policy .... " Subsidies Code,
supra note 6. Article 11:1 states, "Signatories recognize that subsidies other than export
subsidies are widely used as important instruments for the promotion of social and eco-
nomic policy objectives and do not intend to restrict the right of signatories to use such
subsidies to achieve these and other important policy objectives .... Id. However, art.
11:2 of the Subsidies Code does recognize the harms that such domestic subsidies can cause
to other countries, particularly where such subsidies would adversely affect the conditions
of normal competition. Id. The Code further states, "Signatories shall therefore seek to
avoid causing such effects through the use of such subsidies." Id.
As the above language indicates, it is generally recognized that the negotiators at the
Tokyo Round were unable to reach an agreement on a definition of what constitutes a
countervailable domestic subsidy. Note, supra note 16, at 277.
In regard to LDCs, art. 14:2 states, "[Tihis Agreement shall not prevent developing
country signatories from adopting measures and policies to assist their industries, including
those of the export sector." Subsidies Code, supra note 6. Article 14:7 states, "Signatories
recognize that in developing countries, governments may play a large role in promoting
economic growth and development." Id. Article 14:1 states, "Signatories recognize that
subsidies are an integral part of economic development programmes of developing coun-
tries." Id. However, certain provisions of article 14, such as 14:7, recognize that there are
limits to which developing countries may impose subsidies that are damaging to the
importing countries' industry. Id
Although the Subsidies Code may recognize certain special needs of LDCs, the counter-
vailing duty provisions of the Code grant them no special privileges. Rivers & Greenwald,
The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Bridging Fundamen-
tal Policy Differences, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1447, 1481 (1979).
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country from applying countervailing duties.119
D. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE NATURAL RESOURCE BILLS
OUTWEIGH THE DANGERS OF RETALIATION AND
MIRROR LEGISLATION
Opponents of the natural resource bills assert that if the bills are
enacted, they may violate GATT. Such a GATT violation would
result in GATT-authorized retaliation. °20 As noted above, however,
the natural resource proposals do not violate the language or spirit of
GATT or the Subsidies Code.
Aside from the possibility of GATT-authorized retaliation, there
exists the danger of other countries enacting mirror legislation. 12'
United States Deputy Trade Representative Michael B. Smith warns
that the United States definition of countervailable natural resource
subsidies would not bind other countries even though the natural
resource subsidy bills' definition attempted to provide a safe harbor for
United States domestic subsidies.1 22 Other countries could form their
own definitions of countervailable natural resource subsidies to attack
U.S. industries that have a competitive advantage in their markets. 123
Although the natural resource subsidy bills may induce mirror
legislation, such a danger is present every time the United States
enacts trade legislation of this type. The 1974 Trade Act, the 1979
Trade Agreements Act, and the 1984 Trade Act all produced talk of
mirror legislation, but none of these acts resulted in such retaliation. 124
Furthermore, GATT and Subsidies Code signatory countries are
bound not to enact countervailing duties that violate GATT or the
Subsidies Code.
Finally, critics contend that the natural resource bills represent
unilateral action where multilateral action would be more effective and
compatible with United States international trade obligations.
119. In regard to subsidies provided by a government to promote the general welfare of
its citizens, Barshefsky, Diamond and Ellis state that "the international community has
agreed that such actions are exempt if the benefit provided is not sector-specific in nature."
Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, supra note 20, at 65. The authors use the term "sector-
specific" to refer to the specificity test. In support of their statement, however, they cite no
more than the 1979 TAA. Id. at 115. As previously stated, the fact that the United States
has incorporated the specificity test within its own countervailing duty law does not mean
that the specificity test is an internationally agreed upon principle.
120. Proposed Amendments to the Countervailing Duty Law, supra note 1 (testimony of
Michael B. Smith).
121. Id.; see also Barshefsky, Diamond & Ellis, supra note 20, at 70-72; Bello & Holmer,
supra note 12, at 321-23.
122. Proposed Amendments to the Countervailing Duty Law, supra note I (testimony of
M. Smith).
123. Id.
124. Proposed Amendments to the Countervailing Duty Law, supra note 1 (testimony of
Robert Liuzzi on behalf of the Ad Hoe Committee of Domestic Nitrogen Producers).
[Vol. 20:197
NA TURAL RESOURCE SUBSIDY BILLS
Although such multilateral action may be preferable, it has proved
unobtainable, despite United States efforts. 125
The potential benefits of such legislation to United States domes-
tic industry must be weighed against the potential dangers of mirror
legislation and loss of good will among United States trading partners.
CONCLUSION
The natural resource bills clearly possess some drawbacks; how-
ever, the bills fill an injurious void in United States trade law. Existing
trade laws are unable to remedy the problems caused by natural
resource subsidies. In comparison to the existing countervailing duty
law, the natural resource bills contain many advantages.
The United States has three basic choices for dealing with natural
resource subsidies. The United States can: 1) take no action to
counteract the natural resource subsidy problem; 2) continue to strive
for multilateral action; or 3) take unilateral action enacting the pend-
ing natural resource bills or some similar legislative provisions. The
seriousness of injury to United States domestic industries requires that
some action be taken. The second choice seems unrealistic based on
the dim prospect for any multilateral agreement. Therefore, the third
choice appears the most reasonable to remedy United States indus-
tries' problems resulting from foreign natural resource subsidies.
John M. Bradham
125. At the 1979 Tokyo Rounds, the United States negotiators sought to reach agree-
ment on the proper use of domestic subsidies and to establish a procedure for consultation
between parties when domestic subsidies proved injurious. The United States negotiators
embodied their suggested approach in the Supplementary Understanding on Internal Subsi-
dies [unpublished document on file at the offices of LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL
Busmass], which was rejected. Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 118, at 1471-73.
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